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Introduction
It is impossible to properly understand and evaluate South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (TRC) - and to extract significant lessons from it for other societies in transition -
without analyzing the unique prevailing political circumstances which gave rise to its
establishment. The history of the TRC is inextricably linked to the evolution of South Africa's
negotiated settlement1. The most important aspect of South Africa's transformation from
authoritarianism and racism to a constitutional democracy, was that it happened, not by
revolution or force of arms, but through dialogue and an eventual negotiated settlement. This
transition is fundamentally different to that which, for example, Nazi Germany underwent after
World War II - where the conflict produced a clear victor. After World War II, the Allies were
able to take occupation of Germany and impose their version of justice on the Nazi regime at
Nuremberg. In the case of post-war Germany, the approach to those who had committed gross
violations of human rights could therefore be imposed in terms dictated by the victorious party.
Not surprisingly, the victors chose prosecutions as the primary mode of dealing with the past,
not only because they believed this to be morally right, but crucially, because they were able
to do so.
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The South African transition must also be contrasted with the example of transition from
military rule to democracy in Chile. When General Pinochet, the former head of the Chilean
junta, agreed to restore power to an elected civilian government, he still commanded sufficient
power - particularly within the politically interventionist military - to ensure that lie remained
in office as head of the armed forces. As a result of the continued' influence and strength of
the military, the new government was effectively unable, save in a few exceptional
circumstances, to bring charges against those who had been responsible for assassinations,
torture and "disappearances" under Pinochet's rule2. Although the new government in Chile
did establish a Truth Commission in order to officially investigate, record and acknowledge
human rights abuse under military rule, those who were responsible for these abuses remained
unpunished.
If post-war Germany represents one extreme in the transitional justice policy choices which
confront societies during a transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (that of
prosecution), then Chile represents the other end of the spectrum - blanket amnesties for those
who committed gross violations of human rights. Although limitations of space do not permit
a thorough analysis of the South African situation, at the outset of this paper it is critical tu
recognize that South Africa occupies a position somewhere between these two extremes. This
position is represented by the TRC as a response to the last minute compromise struck so laic
in the negotiation process that it had to be included in a "post-amble" tacked on to the end ol
the constitution - almost as an after-thought3. The Post-amble reads as follows:
"This Constitution provides a historic bridge between the past of a deeply divided
society characterized by strife, conflict, untold suffering and injustice, and a future
founded on the recognition of human rights, democracy and peaceful co-existence anil
development opportunities for all South Africans, irrespective of color, race, class.
belief or sex.
The pursuit of national unity, the well-being of all South African citizens and peace
require reconciliation between the people of South Africa and the reconstruction of
society.
The adoption of this Constitution lays the secure foundation for the people of Souih
Africa to transcend the divisions and strife of die past, which generated gross violations
of human rights, the transgression of humanitarian principles in violent conflicts and
the legacy of hatred, fear, guilt and revenge.
These can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need for understanding but not
vengeance, a need for reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu* but not
victimization.
In order to advance such reconciliation and reconstruction, amnesty shall be grained
in respect of acts, omissions and offenses associated with political objectives and
committed in the course of the conflicts of the past. To this end, Parliament under this
Constitution shall adopt a law determining a firm cut-off date, which shall be a dale
after 8 October 1990 and before 6 December 1993, and providing for the mechanisms,
criteria and procedures, including tribunals, if any, through which such amnesty shall
be dealt with at any time after the law is passed.
With this Constitution and these commitments we, the people of South Africa, open
a new chapter in the history of our country."5
After the 1994 elections, one of the first acts of the new Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, was
to signal his intention to establish a TRC. Omar was aware of the binding nature of the Post-
amble to the Constitution and accepted responsibility for enacting legislation which would
provide mechanisms and criteria for the granting of amnesty. But Omar, along with a strong,
vocal and well organized non-governmental human rights sector, was also concerned that an
amnesty process was essentially geared towards the interests of perpetrators and that if South
Africa were ever to come to terms with its past, build national reconciliation and establish a
society based on the respect of human rights, then it would primarily have to cater for the
needs of victims.
The argument here was that, despite the noble motivations for national reconciliation, any
amnesty arrangement without a parallel obligation to disclose the systemic nature of the crimes
perpetrated, in fact has potentially grave implications for the long-term prospects of sustainable
democracy. In particular, for the victims of these abuses of power - on whichever side of the
political spectrum they may reside - the implication would be that they would never have
access to the information essential to their rehabilitation, let alone any prospect of redress at
civil or criminal law. One possible consequence of this is that, in the absence of any public
acknowledgment, coupled to the impossibility of restitution through the courts, widespread
resentment could well manifest itself in informal retribution at both an individual and a
collective level, resulting in escalating rather than de-escalating violence under the new
democratic dispensation.6
The TRC represents a creative response to this very concern. It was therefore decided to
combine the process of granting amnesty to perpetrators, with the processes of officially
establishing the truth about past human rights abuse, providing victims with some form of
reparation and making recommendations to the President as to measures the government should
take to prevent any future recurrence of systematic violations of human rights. By attempting
to foreground the needs and interests of victims, the TRC can be viewed as an attempt to
restore the moral balance to an amnesty agreement, borne of negotiated political compromise,
and which would otherwise engender a reconciliation-building enterprise in South Africa which
exclusively ministered to the needs of former perpetrators. This fusion of an amnesty process
with a truth recovery and reparative process, is without precedent among similar initiatives
internationally. It also demands that any evaluation of the TRC must be undertaken in its own
terms, that is, as a process designed to prioritize the needs and interests of victims of past
gross human rights abuses.
However, the processes of negotiated transition in South Africa entailed more than just a
political compromise on the question of amnesty. The delicate historical process of negotiated
transition in the period after February 1990, also resulted in the new government of national
unity inheriting a dependence on many of the former regime's civil service institutions and
personnel. Of particular significance here, are the agencies of state security - including the
policing and military institutions, as well as those of criminal justice - which were central to
sustaining die Apartheid system deemed illegal at international law. Many of these institutions
and personnel were allegedly directly involved in the clandestine torture, extra-judicial
executions and enforced disappearances of those involved in resistance to the system (or in
sustaining the legal framework which allowed such abuses to occur), yet the nature of the
transition means that they also continue to be depended upon to sustain law and order and as
guardians of a new Bill or Rights, within a society confronting a potential upward spiral of
criminal violence. In addition, many of those who came to power within the new Government
of National Unity, were themselves actively involved in the armed resistance to Apartheid
which, it is claimed, also entailed the violation of human rights within the country and beyond
its borders.
The building of reconciliation, therefore, is not simply about whether prosecutions take place.
but rather what measures are possible to transform and rebuild public confidence in state
institutions and personnel (as well as in the rule of law) which have been inherited through a
negotiation process - along with an historically rooted legacy of public mistrust of these
institutions? This is clearly a wider agenda which reaches well beyond the limited scope of the
TRC's mandate. Nonethelss, it is arguable that the central test which must be applied in
evaluating the TRC's contribution to reconciliation in South Africa, revolves around iis
"forward-looking" contribution to the transformation of such institutions of state, rather than
its "backward-looking" exercise in historical evaluation. Indeed, this process is equally
essential to the long term consolidation of hard-won democracy in South Africa. These
perspectives were broadly hinted at by the Parliamentary Committee of the General Council
of the Bar of South Africa, which argued that the general concern with political reconciliation
must
"... be balanced... by a concern for the administration of justice... It is apparent thut
a blurred pursuit of 'reconciliation and peaceful solutions' without adequate regard fur
its impact on policing, the courts, and the control of crime, will do more to threaten
social stability."7
Once again, the TRC arguably offers a potential (although perhaps imperfect) solution to the
problem posed by this negotiated compromise. In the absence of full disclosure or a truth
recovery process, these inherited institutions of the new government could well retain
unchallenged their organizational culture of clandestine, unaccountable and covert activity.
This institutional culture has historically been fostered by the myriad of legislative measures
which have actively preserved secrecy and governmental privilege in the name of state security
and which have thus contributed to widespread corruption and abuse of power". The TRC
enterprise is therefore as much about recovering the truth about systeinatic human rights abuse
within state institutions (as part of an enterprise to transform these institutions), as it is about
investigating individual victims' cases so as to facilitate their personal healing. It is a
mechanism pregnant with the potential to begin the process of building transparency into
governance and entrenching a human rights culture in South African society and within the
institutions of state. As such, it has the potential to serve not only a backward-looking remedial
role, but a pro-active role in consolidating democracy as well. In part, this evaluation is about
whether the TRC in fact lives up to these expectations.
The South African TRC is also strongly motivated as ultimately having been in the best
interests of victims of human rights abuse in South Africa. It is argued that the only obligation
that the newly elected government had to fulfil was the granting of amnesty. It could have
simply performed this task and no more. By transforming a process geared towards the
interests of perpetrators into an initiative which aimed to restore the dignity of those who have
suffered - thereby strengthening a commitment to fundamental rights and to governmental
transparency and accountability - it is suggested that the government has developed a new
model for reconciling the often competing and contradictory demands faced by similar societies
in transition.
In this and in other respects, evaluating the successes and the failures of the South African
TRC is an infinitely complex task, precisely because the TRC ought essentially to be as much
a forward-looking as a backward-looking process. The long term achievements and/or failures
of the TRC in contributing to the building of a human rights culture, as well as to the re-
establishment of the rule of law and the re-building of popular confidence in credible
institutions of state in post-Apartheid South Africa, will only be properly evaluated in the years
to come. These are goals which, by definition, currently remain intangible and difficult to
measure.
Furthermore, to the extent that the TRC is viewed as an exercise in restorative justice based
on an elaborate objective of building national reconciliation, it is all the more imperative that
we do not judge the TRC enterprise in isolation from either the constraints imposed by the
very nature of a negotiated settlement in South Africa, or from the full range of vehicles
designed to service this objective of reconciliation. To judge the TRC outside of this context
would inherently be to set it up to fail. In the final analysis, the TRC is just one of several
mechanisms for retrospective justice and reconciliation in post-Apartheid South Africa. More
than anything else, reconciliation resides in the substantial redress of past inequities under
Apartheid - in social and economic justice which reaches well beyond the limited reach of
legally-based punitive justice. The ambit of the TRC is limited to dealing with only a small
percentage of (the most serious) human rights abuses. Full social justice is, therefore, as much
dependent on the establishment and functioning of the Human Rights Commission (to engage
with and redress the full spectrum of human rights denials), the Gender Commission (to deal
with the legacy of gender inequality in South Africa), the Land Claims court (to deal with the
history of dispossession), the Youth Commission (to deal with the sustained marginalisation
of the youth sector which has even been compounded by the shift from the politics of
confrontation to the politics of negotiation) etc., as it is about the TRC. Few of Apartheid's
evils can be undone, nor can all of them even be engaged with by a TRC process which is only
concerned with the most gross of human rights violations. In this context, perhaps the greatest
moment in redressing systematic human rights abuses of the Apartheid era, was the very
process of democratization itself - a process effectively guaranteed by the agreement which lay
at the root of the formation of the TRC and by the harsh political realities of a negotiated
amnesty based on full disclosure of the gross violations of human rights for which amnesty is
sought.
Furthermore, any assessment of the TRC must also take full cognizance of the fact that the
body was set a near-impossible task from the very outset. In a large country with many rural
inhabitants, to merely document all the gross violations of human rights that occurred under
Apartheid and to simply provide the space to thousands of victims to recount the stories of
their abuse, all within a time frame of just two years, would require a superhuman effort.
Therefore, to evaluate the TRC against its own ambitious mandate as set-out in the National
Unity and Reconciliation Act', is to measure the TRC against an almost impossible ideal.
However, it remains possible and is fundamentally important, to critically evaluate the TRC
in terms of some of its own stated objectives - and particularly to scrutinize its operations and
assess its processes, through the eyes of victims and survivors themselves. This is all the more
essential considering the extent to which the South African TRC is being widely and
uncritically marketed as a model for other countries in transition. These are the broad
objectives of the following pages of this paper.
Political Compromise: A Double Edged Sword
At the risk of stating the obvious, the fact that the TRC was established in the first place in
South Africa - thereby resisting the purely politically expedient path of collective amnesia
which may easily have resulted from such a negotiated transition - was itself a significant
victory for the processes of political negotiation. The extent of the spirit of negotiated
compromise is, in many respects, best symbolized by the fact that opposing political parties
could agree that public space be made available to victims and survivors - and to the country
as a whole - to look back at the past and recount the horrors of the Apartheid system. In this
respect, considering the conditional nature of the amnesty provision in the TRC Act'", it is
arguable that this controversial section in the TRC legislation, was no more than a creative
vehicle for ensuring that the amnesty clause negotiated into the post-amble to the Interim
Constitution was not unconditional, but was a quid pro quo for truth recovery through full
disclosure. The TRC nonetheless clearly does reflect the ingredients of political expediency
and compromise which are in many respects intrinsic to politically negotiated transition in
South Africa.
It must therefore be recognized that - to a substantial extent - the South African TRC was
defined by the fact that it was a legislative product of this delicate process of negotiation and
was implemented during a process of social transition in which embryonic democracy appeared
to be extremely vulnerable. It has been argued that many of the concessions made - particularly
with regard to amnesty - were ultimately not only necessary to driving forward the process of
political negotiation itself, but were also related to the need to sustain the tenuous commitment
of inherited military and policing establishments to democracy. In many respects it has been
this very delicate political context - including the temporary uncomfortable existence of a
transitional Government of National Unity containing representatives of previously warring
factions - that has plagued the TRC and which has most substantially undermined its potential
political successes.
Although it would be simplistic to merely attribute the fortunes of the Government of National
Unity to the exigencies of amnesty and the TRC processes, it is nonetheless valuable to
recognize the extent to which this political vehicle, having served the purpose of shaping the
legislative objectives and frame of reference of the TRC, disintegrated shortly after the
Commissioners were appointed and the TRC was finally established. The TRC and its future
operations were therefore given life, substantially shaped and irrevocably set upon a path, in
a context which was to dramatically shift shortly after its birth. In some respects, this shaped
the almost bi-polar nature of the TRC's activities in the subsequent two years of its existence:
a "tip toe" vehicle of reconciliation, within an increasingly robust and combative political
environment.
Needless to say, the TRC was consequently not free from political tension, both internally and
in the wider social context. Indeed, it was inevitable that TRC would in fact generate political
conflict and - in some instances - be used as a political football by competing parties. In
essence, the National Party and more extreme right wing groupings were resistant to the
potential further loss of political credibility through the process of investigating past deeds
which the TRC was committed to overseeing. From the outset, dierefore, these parties adopted
the stance that the TRC was likely to become an elaborate "witch-hunt", rather than a tool of
reconciliation. The National Party, along with the Inkatha Freedom Party, have consequently
continually accused the TRC of being biased - and have frequently taken to the courts in order
to substantially inhibit the work of the Commission.
In some senses, the greatest political liability - and arguably failure - of the TRC, was its
propensity to pander to these hostile political groupings in an apparently desperate bid to keep
them committed to the process. However, once the National Party left the Government of
National Unity, it was simply no longer subject to the political constraints which had played
so great a role in shaping the paradigm, legislation and approach of the TRC itself. It is in this
wider political context that one needs to understand the eventual angry refusal by the National
Party to cooperate with the TRC, as well as the constant attempts to undermine its work
through legal filibustering on the basis that the TRC was alleged to have failed to comply with
the terms of the National Unity and Reconciliation Act - which required that the TRC operate
in an unbiased manner in considering gross violations of human rights on all sides of the
conflicts of the past. It is perhaps the greatest testimony to the TRC's ultimate failure to act
in a sufficiently robust manner in its dealings with the former government and right wing
groupings, that the National Party - in the absence of any substantial apology for its own role
as architect of Apartheid as a crime against humanity - actually demanded that the TRC
apologize to it! This was a rather transparent political stroke which sought to entirely shift the
focus of public attention from the National Party's complicity in gross violations of human
rights, to the alleged indiscretions of the TRC itself. Were it not for the TRC's own soft-shoe
shuffle in dealing with right wing political interests during the preceding year, this manouevre
would not have appeared nearly as masterful.
Yet from the very outset, the government (and subsequently the TRC itself) had sought to do
everything possible to avoid these sorts of political conflicts. In an attempt to counteract
precisely sucli political manoeuvring, the Commissioners themselves were ostensibly selected
in such a manner as best ensured even-handedness - yet which ultimately sought to achieve this
by ensuring representation of all the major political interest groups within the country on the
TRC. The composition of the TRC was meant to assuage doubts from political parties that the
TRC would be politically biased - and this was done, not by considering the human rights track
record of all the candidates, but by prioritizing the broadest possible base of political
representation.
In fairness, the importance of securing public perceptions of objectivity in this manner cannot
be too glibly dismissed. Nor for that matter can the TRC itself be held responsible for the
consequences of such an inclusive approach - in view of the fact that the TRC Commissioners
did not appoint themselves. Nonetheless, there is little doubt that the TRC subsequently
grappled with the consequences of this approach. It is, however, arguable that such
impartiality could have been best achieved through the TRC's hearings and its Human Rights
Violations and Amnesty Committees. In truth, these Committees generally sought to hear
representatives from all sides of conflict and in evaluating the TRC on this basis, it most
certainly has not been overtly or covertly politically biased. Nonetheless, the quest to ensure
impartiality and even-handedness in the composition of the Commission itself did lead to
complications that may not have been foreseen by its architects. Political conflicts within the
TRC, fueled by the vastly different political backgrounds and beliefs of Commissioners and
staff, unquestionably negatively affected its operational efficiency in some of its Committees.
This tense political climate within the TRC has also contributed to difficulties with the
Commission accepting constructive outside intervention and for allowing the incorporation ol
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in its ongoing operations.
Of course the political dilemmas which confronted the TRC did not merely manifest in respect
of internal dynamics or in relation to NGOs. Because of its delicate political task to examine
human rights violations on all sides of the South African conflict, the TRC proved to be
subject to substantial pressure to constantly demonstrate its even-handedness. It is arguable that
- in some instances - this has resulted in an overly tentative process and approach to building
reconciliation, in which the Commission proved reluctant to fully utilize its substantial powers
of search, seizure and subpoena. The domination of right wing opposition to the TRC and
extensive attempts to secure the support of right wing political parties, meant that the TRC
resisted any "assertive" opportunities to acquire information, but instead sought to delicately
win over voluntary right wing support for the Commission as a social enterprise in building
reconciliation. Unfortunately, as a result, few perpetrators voluntarily came forward to seek
amnesty during the early period of the TRC's operations (with the exception of many who had
already been convicted or jailed for their past activities), putting considerable pressure on the
TRC's amnesty process.
Indeed, it is arguable that the flood of applications for amnesty which did occur towards the
end of 1996, was less the result of a looming cut-off date for amnesty applications (this date
was originally scheduled for 15 December 1996, but was extended by the State Presideni in
response to a request from the TRC), than it was the result of the successful prosecution of
Eugene De Kock - a notorious Apartheid assassin who, during his trial, provided extensive
information about other senior state operatives who were involved in gross human rights
abuses". In some respects, this is illustrative of the fact that far from being totally
incompatible with it, the direat of successful prosecution in fact remains directly functional to
the successful process of truth recovery linked to a conditional amnesty option.
The politically delicate task of the TRC also affected its relations with those victims who
expressed legitimate frustrations at the fact that they could not expect full justice - the
prosecution of those who were known to be responsible for the murder of their loved ones. In
particular, constitutional challenges to the amnesty process which were brought by the Azanian
Peoples' Organization (AZAPO), as well as relatives of Steve Biko, murdered ANC activists
Dr Griffiths and Victoria Mxenge and the relatives of slain Dr Fabian Ribeiro, rather than
being viewed as legitimate and understandable demands of Apartheid's survivors, were
presented by some Commissioners as being oppositional to the Commission and its quest tor
reconciliation. Although most of these tensions were more sensitively tackled by the TRC in
the last year of its operation, this did do some damage to the image of the Commission -
especially considering the early failures of the processes of voluntary disclosure before the
Amnesty Committee.
However, whilst the TRC's Amnesty Committee was plagued by controversy and popular
misunderstanding, its Human Rights Violations Committee remained largely immune from
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such politically-rooted problems. Consequently, the great strength of the TRC resided in the
operations of this Committee - which needed to make no moral or political distinctions
between the experiences of victims from all sides of the conflict. The result was a uniquely
powerful process whereby a full spectrum of those who suffered gross violations of their
human rights within the conflicts of the past, testified before the Committee and before the
South African public. The social impact of this process of public testimony has been the
greatest achievement of the TRC - and will undoubtedly have a pervasive influence on South
African society in the years to come.
Nonetheless, the accusations and strategy adopted by the National Party is illustrative of the
fact that tensions between political parties and the TRC have persisted - despite any efforts to
represent all victims of the conflict at hearings and through the composition of the TRC. By
the same token, the failure of the Commission to deal with this abuse of the platform it
provides, can be seen as a failure on its part to guide and command the process it was
overseeing right from the start. This had the effect of partially undermining the legitimacy of
the TRC and hence its usefulness as a tool for reconciliation and nation building.
In br"-> i terms, many of the political successes and failures of the TRC must also be viewed
ii: ; i of the inheritance of state institutions by the new government through the
net, .m process - and which continued to suffer a legacy of historically-rooted public
mistrust. The impossibility of instantly transforming the credibility, institutional culture and
delivery capacity of these state institutions, was often compounded by the reluctance of
established bureaucrats to accept and implement the programmes of a new political leadership
in government. By the same token, many of the new senior state functionaries put in place by
the new government, lacked the technical expertise and experience to effectively run some of
these state departments. The cumulative consequence of these processes was a significant
disjuncture and a growing gap between the new government's visionary policy making capacity
and its capacity to translate such policy into implementation or delivery. These problems of
government in transition directly affected the TRC. Firstly, because the TRC itself was really
the product of precisely diis sort of creative and innovative policy-making approach. However,
even more fundamental was the fact that the Commission, like the government, had to rely on
many of these institutions, including the South African Police Service, the Office of the
Attorney General, etc., to facilitate the very process of truth recovery and reconciliation. The
inefficiencies and apparent wilful blocking action of some of these state functionaries is - by
its very nature - difficult to document, but these dynamics unquestionably impacted on the
Commission and its political profile. These dynamics were also further complicated by the
complex relationship of TRC - as an independent statutory body - to government, and this
undoubtedly contributed to some of the problems and indeed failures of the TRC.
It is, however, a truism that TRCs never operate in a vacuum and that therefore every
commission works under political constraints or contextual challenges which cannot necessarily
be avoided. The South African TRC should be evaluated with this in mind and, despite the
many political problems elaborated on above, it is important to re-iterated that the very
existence of the TRC in a country going through such a transition process, is a significant
political success in itself. However, there are also more diffuse setbacks related to these
political dynamics which will be considered below. Perhaps the most important of these have
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been the compromises endured in respect of victims' rights which were effectively negotiated
away by politicians at the negotiation table. This in turn has been closely related to suggestions
of compromise to the constitutional and legal rights framework, as well as to the integrity ol
post-Apartheid criminal justice jurisprudence.
Lessons in Criminal Law and Restorative Justice
In seeking to extract lessons from the South African TRC which may be of value to other
societies involved in the transition to democracy, it is useful to engage with some of the central
debates which have arisen over the relationship between reconciliation and justice in South
Africa. The first such debate has suggested that there is an inherent contradiction between the
competing claims of truth recovery linked to amnesty on one hand, as opposed to punnive
justice models on the other. This has often been crudely characterized as a siark choice
between reconciliation and justice models - as if the two approaches are inherently
incompatible. However, the simple argument has been made by many frustrated victims ol
Apartheid, that there can be no reconciliation without justice. By the same token, an
examination of the South African TRC demonstrates in practice the functionality of parallel
processes of truth recovery and prosecutions and suggests that a conditional (rather than
unconditional) amnesty is anything but incompatible with prosecution in some instances.
Indeed, it has already been suggested that more than the carrot of amnesty, it was the threat
of prosecutions which eventually drove many perpetrators into the confessional of the TRC's
Amnesty Committee12. Their revelations, along with those of the victims' testimonies which
were elicited by the TRC's Human Rights Violations Committee, provided a powerful,
graphic, and at times cathartic, picture of the various experiences of Apartheid's
dehumanization. In the final analysis therefore, rather than being construed as an alternative
to criminal prosecutions, the argument in favor of the TRC enterprise must be that some form
of "truth recovery" is always better - and more functional to long term prospects ol
reconciliation - than collective amnesia about gross human rights violations... whether this
accompanies prosecutions or not.13
A considerably more substantial debate revolves around the suggestion that the South African
TRC represents a failure to comply with international law obligations to punish such gross
violations of human rights. Here it has been argued that the TRC falls foul of international
law, precisely on the basis that, far from meeting the needs of victims, it in fact sacrifices their
interests in the name of political expediency by providing for an amnesty for perpetrators ot
crimes against humanity. Indeed, although motivated in the name of victims, this approach
implicitly rests more firmly on an interpretation of international law which suggests that certain
crimes - such as crimes against humanity and acts of genocide - rise to the level of jus cogeiis
and constitute obligatio erga omnes, and are therefore inderogable'4. In other words, it is
anathema to suggest that amnesty could be granted in respect of such crimes'5.
In this respect, the TRC raises some critical points of debate for the newly established
International Criminal Court (ICC) which, although it does not have retrospective jurisdiction
over the South African situation, motivates for strict criminal liability for crimes such as those
capable of receiving amnesty through the South African TRC. Of particular interest here, is
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the fact that the ICC approach, like the TRC, is strongly motivated as being in the best
interests of victims of such crimes and gross human rights abuses. Not least amongst the
questions which the South African TRC therefore poses (but does not resolve), is that of the
relationship between ICC prosecutions and domestic TRC options in countries undergoing a
negotiated transition to democracy. The answers to these questions are very difficult to
anticipate, even if one does suggest that victim-based truth telling and judicial process
concerned with perpetrators are - notionally at least - mutually compatible.
However, some of the most striking lessons to be learned from the South African TRC in fact
relate to the fundamental clumsiness of criminal law, both as a tool for achieving
reconciliation, and for best servicing the needs of victims and survivors of human rights
abuses. This raises some fundamental questions for the punitive justice paradigm inherent in
most motivations for the establishment of a permanent ICC. Indeed, if there is a more
meaningful debate intrinsic to the TRC process, then it is most appropriately framed as a
debate between restorative and punitive systems of justice, rather than between incompatible
"justice" and "reconciliation" models. What is most striking about these debates is that
virtually all the protagonists motivate their approaches as being in the best interests of victims
and survivors of human rights abuse - and it is therefore a critical objective of this article to
evaluate these claims.
Considering that the obligation to grant amnesty was entrenched in South Africa's Interim
Constitution, it is no surprise that some of these debates were actually waged before the newly
established Constitutional Court. Furthermore, this constitutional challenge to the TRC Act
was brought by the survivors of some of Apartheid's most notorious victims. For these
reasons, it is worthwhile to briefly consider the constitutional challenge which was launched
against the amnesty provisions of the TRC Act. It is not possible in the space available to
consider all aspects of this Constitutional Court decision, so this article will focus on just some
of the key relevant concerns.
There is a certain irony in asking a court to rule on the validity of an agreement without which
it would probably not exist. Yet in evaluating the constitutionality of the amnesty provisions
and their implications in the TRC Act, this is precisely what the South African Constitutional
Court was doing. Constitutional courts are typically required to safeguard both democracy and
the fundamental rights of individuals. In this particular matter, the potential tension between
these two imperatives was also thrown into sharp relief. In their papers before the
Constitutional Court in the matter of AZAPO and Others v The President of the Republic of
South Africa and Others, the applicants argued that section 20(7) of the TRC Act was
unconstitutional. The pertinent part of section 20(7) provides that:
"No person who has been granted amnesty in respect of an act, omission or offence
shall be criminally or civilly liable in respect of such act, omission or offence and no
body or organization or the State shall be liable, and no person shall be vicariously
liable, for any such act, omission or offence."
The central contention of the applicants was that section 20(7) of the TRC Act violated the
right of access to court enshrined in section 22 of the Bill of Rights, which provides that:
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"Every person shall have the right to have justiciable disputes settled by a court of law
or, where appropriate, another independent or impartial forum."16
It was argued by the applicants that by extinguishing the criminal liability of perpetrators to
whom amnesty has been granted and by preventing victims from bringing civil claims against
those who had violated their rights, section 20(7) violates individuals' rights of access to
justice.
The Constitutional Court held that once amnesty is granted, this does indeed result in the
removal of criminal liability and the civil liability of individuals or of the state, as well as the
vicarious liability of individuals or organizations. The Court advanced two central reasons tor
holding that extinguishing criminal liability was constitutional in this case. Firstly, citing the
post-amble to the Interim Constitution, the Court argued that, in the name of the peaceful
transition to democracy and with due regard for the agonizing balancing act between the need
for justice and the need for reconciliation, the Interim Constitution explicitly made a choice
in favor of reparation over retaliation and ubuntu over victimization. Furthermore, the Court
went on to hold that whether or not amnesty should be interpreted to include extinguishing
civil liability hinged on whether one adopts a narrow or a broad definition of the term. It held
that amnesty has no inherent or fixed meaning and that its definition must depend on the
circumstances in which it applies. On this basis the Court held diat if the offer of amnesty were
to be a genuine incentive to encourage perpetrators to come forward and make full disclosure
of their crimes, then it should entail extinguishing both criminal and civil liability. Very few
people would come forward if they knew that in doing so, they would expose themselves to
damages claims in civil suits. If such people did not come forward then victims would never
know the truth and the process of reconciliation would be impeded. On this basis, the C.'ouri
held that it was permissible to extinguish civil liability in respect of acts for which amnesty has
been granted.
in this context, a little more attention will now be given to the second reason offered by the
Court for holding the amnesty from criminal prosecution to be constitutional. Here it held that
in the majority of instances the right to prosecute those who have committed gross violations
of human rights is, in any event, an 'abstract right'17. This is because in most cases the
evidence necessary to obtain convictions - or even to sustain civil claims - does not exist or has
been deliberately destroyed." It is in this context that the Court argued that one of the only
ways in which victims could obtain the truth about human rights abuse was if perpetrators were
provided with an incentive to come forward and make full disclosure as to the crimes that they
committed19. The removal of criminal liability was regarded as precisely such an incentive. In
addition the Court held that the process of encouraging perpetrators to reveal their crimes
would make them confront their past and help society understand its history. It further added
mat these are important parts of the process of reconciliation to which the Interim Constitution
was explicitly committed2".
The Court could have further substantiated its argument that the right to prosecute is really an
'abstract right' by making reference to the state of South Africa's criminal justice system.
Even if the evidence to prosecute perpetrators of human rights abuse did exist, the criminal
justice system was simply not practically capable of processing thousands and thousands of
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such prosecutions. Although it was not framed as such by the Constitutional Court, in the
absence of the evidence necessary to achieve effective prosecutions, coupled with the absence
of a functional criminal justice system capable of securing such convictions, this raised the
specter of the one scenario which clearly would do more damage to the forward looking
agenda of re-building public confidence in the legal system and the rule of law in South Africa
than the apparent impunity associated with amnesty: that is, impunity based upon a failed
prosecutions process. Were this to happen, the few perpetrators who were tried and acquitted
would then be able to deny their involvement in human rights abuse, thus perpetuating a
culture of impunity, eroding any residual faith in the rule of law, and potentially leading to
even greater anger and cynicism on the part of victims and survivors.
Similar risks will arguably plague the proposed ICC. If the "strike rate" of the Bosnian and
Rwandan War Crimes Tribunals are anything to go by, there is little point in such a punitive
justice model if it is not enforceable - whether at a national level or by the international
community. At best the prospect is of "symbolic show trials" which may play a vital role in
restoring international legal principle, but without restoring the integrity of the rule of law at
a public or grass-roots level and without ever restoring public confidence in institutions of
criminal and civil justice.
Furthermore, even where such prosecutions do take place, it is highly debatable whether this
satisfies the needs and expectations of victims and survivors to the extent that is often assumed.
Certainly in the South African case, criminal convictions do not jurisprudentially found any
automatic civil claim for compensation on the part of the injured party21. The consequence of
this is that the few South Africans who enjoy the prospect of successful prosecution of those
who killed their loved ones - and who are poverty stricken and marginalised by virtue of their
very victimization - will in most instances still face a lack of access to civil justice on the
simple basis that it remains unaffordable. Until these jurisprudential anomalies are eliminated,
or the South African justice system is substantially transformed, the Constitutional Court may
be right... there is only an abstract right of access to justice for victims of Apartheid.
Yet this punitive justice model, which is perhaps least functional in servicing victims' needs
for some form of direct compensation or reparation, is all too easily motivated as being in their
best interests. In fact, this discussion demonstrates two clear lessons: the first is the revealing
clumsiness of punitive criminal law as an appropriate tool for meeting the reparative needs of
victims and survivors. The second related lesson (which will be elaborated on slightly in the
pages below), is the grave danger which resides in seeking to speak on behalf of victims and
survivors, instead of more directly rendering their own complex voices and needs audible. The
harsh reality is that for the vast majority of South African victims of gross human rights
violations, they probably stood to gain more from the opportunity to tell their stories (coupled
with the very meager reparations which the TRC promised), than they were likely to gain from
the punitive criminal justice route. None of this should be taken to deny the devastating impact
(both individually and in legal principle) of the ultimate compromise which this entails for
those few exceptions - such as the Biko and Mxenge families - who stood an excellent chance
of succeeding through the criminal and civil courts. It also offers scant consolation to suggest
that their sacrifice represents the bitter pill which has to be swallowed in the name of the
general good - and as part of a difficult transition to democracy in South Africa.
15
There are also some anomalies in the Court's arguments regarding civil liability and the
vicarious liability of the State which warrant mentioning. If a perpetrator applies for and
receives amnesty for murder, torture or another politically motivated violent crime, then on
the basis of the Court's finding, the victim will effectively be denied the ability to bring a civil
claim or press criminal charges against the perpetrator. However, because of the limited
definition of "gross human rights abuse", the victim of any lesser offense which did not fall
within the definition - and for which, therefore, amnesty could not be sought - would not be
denied rights of access to full civil or criminal justice (assuming such a victim could prove liis
or her case). The irony is that rather than victims of gross human rights abuses being
privileged relative to the wide range of other victims of Apartheid's evils, it is they who - in
principle at least - may be prejudiced. By the same token, the granting of amnesty to those
who murdered and tortured in the name of a political cause, is not a luxury to which those
rendered poverty stricken by Apartheid - and who were jailed for stealing - have any access.
The caricature is that whilst the murderer may get off, the chicken thief certainly will not! li
seems that these are still further contradictions with which we have to learn to live in such
difficult transitions.
"Dispensing" with International Law Obligations22
The vision of the Constitutional Court contains some important lessons (which may also be
significant for the future workings of the ICC) in respect of the extent to which national
jurisdiction relates to international law. In evaluating South Africa's obligations under
international law and after a cursory survey of three countries in South America (Chile.
Argentina and El Salvador), the Constitutional Court came to the conclusion that in all of these
countries, the principle was accepted that amnesty should be granted to violators of human
rights abuse in order to consolidate emerging democracies. On this basis it suggested thai there
is no single or uniform practice in international law regarding the granting of amnesty.
There are a number of problems with this approach. Firstly, the Court failed to consider any
of the instances where emerging democracies have chosen to punish, rather than pardon, those
who have committed gross violations of human rights. In fact, in two of the most recent
instances in Africa, both the Rwandan23 and the Ethiopian" governments have chosen to
prosecute offenders. Secondly, the Court is on extremely questionable ground when it assens
that in the three countries it did canvass, there was a principled acceptance that amnesties
should be granted in order to consolidate democracy. In both Chile and Argentina, amnesties
were much more the result of powerful and interventionist militaries, who either refused to
allow a transition to democracy, or who threatened new democracies with coups, unless their
conditions were met.23 It is unfortunate to extract a principle in relation to amnesties, from
circumstances where these amnesties were in large part a product of coercion by forces much
more concerned with escaping the consequences of their past criminal actions, than with
"consolidating democracy". The Court is nevertheless correct (albeit for the wrong reasons)
in its assertion that there is no standard practice among states regarding the granting of
amnesty. However, this approach does not seem to take the matter much further and could be
used as strongly to support the contention that prosecutions are not obligatory, as it could to
argue in support of the proposition that they are permissible and appropriate.
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The Court then turned to consider an argument by the applicants concerning the applicability
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the obligation contained therein to provide for effective
penal sanctions for persons who order or commit grave breaches of these Conventions. It was
in this context that the Court considered the status of international law under the South African
Constitution. Here the Court held:
"The issue which falls to be determined in this Court is whether section 20(7) of the
|TRC| Act is inconsistent with the Constitution. If it is, the enquiry as to whether or
not international law prescribes a different duty is irrelevant to that determination."
(Authors' emphasis).
Van Zyl and Simpson argue that this statement is puzzling, contradictory and potentially
dangerous. The Court is quite correct in stating that the central issue to be determined is
whether the provision which permits amnesty is consistent with the Constitution. However,
Section 35(1) of the Constitution reads as follows:
". . . in interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of law shall promote the
values which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality
and shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the
protection of the rights entrenched in the Chapter..."
It is therefore impossible to discern whether an impugned law is, or is not, consistent with the
Constitution without having regard to international law. In fact, the use of the word "shall"
in section 35(1) indicates that, in interpreting the constitution, it is obligatory to have regard
to such law. The Court is therefore completely wrong, as a matter of pure logic, when it slates
"whether or not international law prescribes a different duty is irrelevant" to the process of
determining constitutionality. International law may not be binding, particularly in instances
where it conflicts directly with a constitutional provision, but it seems clear that the court
should attempt as far as possible to interpret broad or ambiguous constitutional provisions in
such a way that they conform with international law".
This prompts Van Zyl and Simpson to conclude that:
"The Court seems to believe, quite erroneously in our opinion, that there is a 'two
stage' approach to considering the applicability of international law. First, one comes
to a 'proper interpretation' of what is authorized by the Constitution and then secondly,
one considers the rules of international law. If there is a conflict between the first
meaning and the second then the former must prevail. This is a deeply unfortunate
approach because by applying international law, post hoc, to a meaning which has
already been divined, one reduces its impact on the process of constitutional
interpretation, such that it is only ever used to buttress a conclusion that has already
been reached - but never to influence the conclusion itself."27
The fact that the Court came to the conclusion that extinguishing criminal liability for gross
violations of human rights was constitutional, before it even turned to consider international
law, is indicative of the importance it attaches to this corpus of law. International law is treated
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almost as an after-thought rather than a body of rules which governs the activities of civilized
nations. Van Zyl and Simpson lament the fact that after so much parochialism, chauvinism and
outright hostility to international law by South African Courts under Apartheid, one would
(hint that the new Constitutional Court would devote more time and intellectual rigor to
considering the topic. This neglect is all the more disappointing if one considers the various
other judgements that the Court had handed down in the period preceding the TRC case. In
almost all instances international law was referred to, and regarded as persuasive. Van Zyl and
Simpson go on to point out the irony that the struggle for democracy in South Africa was given
extra impetus by the fact that, both domestically and abroad, Apartheid could be condemned
as a violation of international law. The strength of international law derives in part from the
fact that it is accepted by the world community of nations and is applied in their courts. By
adopting such a narrow and uncreative approach to the status of international law within our
domestic legal system, particularly concerning a matter which will be scrutinized by other
countries and courts who find themselves in similar situations, our Constitutional Court has
eroded the moral and legal force of international law at home and abroad.
It would clearly have been preferable for the Court to have conducted a thorough and rigorous
survey of international law on the subject before coming to the conclusion that it did. Although
there is considerable debate on the issue, it is arguable that the amnesty provisions articulated
in the TRC Act could still have been held not to violate international law. Space does noi
permit an exhaustive treatment of this issue" but two brief points should suffice to demonstrate
that the argument could be made. Firstly, the amnesty in South Africa is not unconditional nor
was it granted by an outgoing government to itself. It is only activated by the voluntary full
disclosure of the perpetrator him/herself, should only be granted if the criteria defining a
political crime are satisfied and is only permissible if the means chosen to achieve the political
objective are proportionate to the objective itself. Furthermore, it is arguable (although it may
be stretching the point) that there is in fact a punitive element intrinsic to the "shaming"
associated with the public nature of the amnesty hearings and the publication of the names of
those who are granted amnesty in the Government Gazette. Secondly, it is generally accepted
in international law that "a nation does not have to commit political suicide" in fulfilling its
obligation to punish, those responsible for gross violations of human rights. Even commentators
who have gone to great lengths to attempt to demonstrate that there is a duty to punish certain
crimes under international law have conceded that if such a course of action would plunge a
country into violence or destroy an embryonic transition to democracy, then this obligation
should be tempered by other considerations".
in considering the South African context, Cachalia adopts this position. He argues that "the
moral imperative" does not always yield a conclusive answer as to whether states are obliged
to prosecute gross violations of human rights, and that other needs and objectives may demand
a different approach. In particular he refers to the need for national reconciliation or the need
to secure the compliance of strategically located elites in the society, who may otherwise
threaten the process of democratization. Thus, despite the affirmative obligation on states to
investigate and prosecute gross human rights violations which exists in international law,
Cachalia argues that the better view is that such states have a discretion in the exercise of this
obligation. However, it is generally agreed, he continues, that all governments at very least
have an obligation to establish the facts - so that the truth becomes publicly known and
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officially part of a nation's history. This obligation remains where particular conditions may
demand that "clemency" is the best possible policy option in a particular state at a particular
time.30 The debate over whether South Atrica could have achieved democracy through
negotiations without an amnesty agreement, will undoubtedly always generate competing
answers.
Legal Truth or Psycho-Social Truth? - The Tension Between Quasi-Judicial Process and
Victim-Centered Story Telling
i
Despite the extent and significance of the above debates over legal and constitutional principle,
it would be misleading to assume the that the major legal challenges to the TRC came from
frustrated victims. On the contrary, the TRC has revealed one of the richest ironies embedded
in the democratization and constitutionalisation of politics in South Africa: the extent to which
a defensive resort to constitutional entitlement has been used as a means of procedurally-based
protection against exposure, by those very people who formerly perpetrated gross violations
of basic human rights. Some mention has already been made of the politically-motivated legal
filibustering of the National Party, which tried to undermine the work of the TRC through the
courts - on the basis that the TRC's operations were biased. A wide range of procedural points
have also been similarly used by alleged perpetrators who threatened defamation suits,
demanded prior notice if they were to be implicated, insisted on amnesty hearings in camera,
etc. Ultimately it was those who had most to hide who astutely sought constitutional
protection, thereby almost crippling the TRC's functions through wrapping it up in very costly
and time consuming litigation battles. Like the TRC process, it is highly likely that the TRC's
final report will confront similar constraints over whether or
perpetrators.
not it names the alleged
However, it is fascinating to note that most of the legal and jurisprudential dilemmas presented
by the TRC process are actually rooted in its own almost bi-polar roles as both a 'fact-finding'
and quasi-judicial enterprise on one hand, and as a psychologically sensitive mechanism for
story telling and healing on the other. This duality in the functions of the TRC is manifested
in the different approaches and roles of its various Committees. The Amnesty Committee has
operated very much along the lines of a quasi-judicial process within the boundaries of
substantial procedural constraint imposed by the demands of due process. By contrast, in its
public hearings, the Human Rights Violations Committee constantly grappled with the
competing needs to allow victims and survivors the space to tell their stories on one hand, and
the objectives of verification of information on the other. The result has often been a process
in which either the fact-finding mission of this Committee has been utterly sacrificed in the
name of being psychologically sensitive to the testifying victim, orj alternatively, a process in
which sharp cross examination by Commissioners has appeared to completely negate the "story
telling" objectives of the Committee.
At the procedural level, most of the legal challenges confronted by the Commission have
revolved around prior notification of those named in the testimonies of others, and have
centered on the argument that anyone named as a perpetrator should be given due notice and
should enjoy the constitutionally enshrined right to defend him or herself. This has exacerbated
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the above tensions inherent in the Human Rights Violations Committee, by potentially
thrusting the Committee on a path towards adversarial and procedure-bound fact-finding - or
alternatively by stimulating self-censorship on the part of victims in order to fend off potential
damages claims for defamation if they cannot prove their claims against an alleged perpetrator.
Quite apart from the implications which this had for the "culture" of the Committee hearings,
it also raised the specter of the earlier Goldstone Commission of Enquiry into Public Violence
which, in one instance, via precisely such a route, became procedurally bogged down for over
three years in investigating just eleven incidents of public violence. Needless to say, the TRC's
Human Rights Violations Committee could simply not afford such a legally oriented approach,
especially considering its obligation to publicly hear or take statements from over 20 000
victims... not to mention the impact this would have in compromising the very objective of
the truth recovery process - public knowledge.
In many respects, this 'tightrope walk' between the competing claims of truth recovery as a
psychologically sensitive, victim-centered process, and truth recovery as a 'quasi-judicial'
process centered on verifiable facts, remains fundamentally irreconcilable. The reason for this
essentially resides in the simple fact that these are different versions of the truth which are
being sought. The 'formal' truth sought through legal process is a testimony constrained by
the legal rights of others, is subject to strict criteria of verification and is often deliberately
shaped by an agreed universe of facts or information (for example in plea bargaining exercises
or where defense and prosecution teams jointly establish an 'agreed statement of facts'). Such
formal truth recovery for the purposes of establishing criminal liability, is ostensibly based on
objective criteria (beyond a reasonable doubt) and excludes any contextual information which
cannot be demonstrated to have had a direct impact on the experience or activities of the
individual testifying or being tried. The substantive 'truth' associated with sociological.
psychological or historical investigation, on the other hand, whilst reducible to empirical
expression, nonetheless engages with and accommodates contradiction as normative,
recognizes the inherent validity of the subjective and exists only in the environment of the
wider universe of experience which contextualizes the actions and motivations of the
protagonists. Whilst legal truth presumes a definitive resolution of competing interpretations
'judged' by an objective standard, historical or psychological investigation presumes no such
resolution, but rather recognizes that there is no single truth, only competing versions. The
processes of social and psychological healing through recounting of past abuses, therefore
cannot function effectively if constantly subject to the narrowing constraints of formal judicial
process.
The South African TRC offers a clear lesson to other societies in transition, in that the process
of recovering a suppressed and unwritten history shaped by conflicts - which in many respects
endure through the lengthy process of transition to democracy - will inevitably have to engage
with these tensions and contradictions. In such a transition, where one of the fundamental
objectives is to restore the popular credibility of procedural justice, this objective may often
appear to in fact be in tension with creative attempts to provide previously silenced victims
with a voice and with public acknowledgment for their suffering. For this reason, it is
imperative that victims and survivors are organized and that their voices are rendered directly
audible, rather than allowing politicians and policy makers to speak on their behalf. It is to this
specific concern that this article will now turn.
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Listening to the Voices of Victims
It has already been noted that both proponents of punitive justice, as well as those arguing in
favor of the South African TRC, claim that their approach is in the best interests of victims
of past gross violations of human rights. One of the most important llessons to be learned from
an evaluation of the South African TRC relates to the grave disservice done to victims by those
who seek to speak on (heir behalf - whether in the name of justice or reconciliation. In so
doing, victims themselves are in fact rendered silent.
Much has already been said of the failures of punitive justice to!serve victims as well as is
often presumed. More still needs to be said about the dangers of presuming that TRC-based
'reconciliation' - itself a contested term - necessarily achieves a greater amount. In both
instances, the disservice to victims resides in the common tendency to treat their needs as
uniform and as static. Generalized and conveniently summarized victims' expectations (end to
denigrate the complex and inconsistent human identity of such victims and survivors, ignoring
the extent to which needs vary from victim to victim and change across time. Presumptions
that victims need or demand punitive justice are no more reliable than are (he claims thai
victims are willing 10 forgive perpetrators who confess, or that they merely seek
acknowledgment and symbolic reparations.31
The discourse of 'forgiveness' which has embroidered much of the TRC's work, which
characterized the dominant Christian religious character of many of the TRC's proceedings and
which was prevalent in the media reporting of the public hearings of the Human Rights
Violations Committee, is perhaps most illustrative of how this denigration of complex victim
needs played itself out during the hearings of the TRC. In many senses, (he onerous
expectation was set up that reconciliation was premised on victims' ability to forgive". Yet in
(ruth, (he TRC was no more about forgiveness on the part of victims, than it was about
contrition on the part of perpetrators who sought amnesty. If the Commission did offer an
opportunity for dealing with wounds of the past and for healing, then it has to be
acknowledged that expressions of anger and the desire for revenge (rather than forgiveness)
on the part of victims, may in fact be more functional to the sort of substantive recovery best
characterized by the shift in identity from 'victim' to 'survivor'. It is the s(rong view of this
writer that true reconciliation in South African society, can only be achieved by integrating the
anger, sorrow, trauma and various other complex feelings of victims, rather than by subtly
suppressing them.
A proper evaluation of the TRC process reveals that victim needs were neither static,
consistent or constant. They were complex and changed over time, very much in keeping with
complex human identity, shaped by the enduring and complex impact of trauma. For some,
they craved more than anything else the basic information about disappeared relatives, for
others the need was for widespread acknowledgment of their torture. Some sought direct
confrontation or victim-offender mediation interventions with the perpetrators responsible for
their suffering, others only wanted to know of the systemic issues and the commands given
which gave rise to their abuse. Some rejected the TRC enterprise entirely and demanded full
justice. For some, their needs were intensely personal and private, for others the quest was for
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community-based or political vindication. Not only did these needs vary from survivor to
survivor, but the needs of any one victim also changed over time. For many, who initially
sought no more than acknowledgment and symbolic reparation from the process, these needs
understandably changed when - some time after they testified - a perpetrator confessed for the
first time to having killed their loved ones. Similarly, as the prospects of material reparation
measures became more real, so did the demands from some victims for monetary
compensation. In still'other instances, as the TRC failed to uncover or investigate the facts
behind some cases, so some victims became embittered and disillusioned with the TRC
process.
All of these complex victims' voices are legitimate and all are integral to the challenge ol
building reconciliation in a traumatized society enduring a transition to democracy. The central
lesson of all this, however, relates to the importance of victim support structures and an
organized voice for victims as critical to the trajectory and outcome of the process -
particularly when both the Commission and its political architects are too often willing to
compromise for the sake of politically-based reconciliation. In South Africa, in contrast to the
Truth Commissions of Argentina or Chile, there was some early organization of survivor
support groups and organs of civil society, able to articulate the demands and needs of victims
during the life of the TRC and thereby capable of playing a role in shaping the process as it
unfolded. By contrast, in Argentina and in Chile, it was only once the findings of their Truth
Commissions left survivors dissatisfied and angry, that they found their organizational voice.
Another critical role of such survivor support structures is that they complemented the TRC's
own concerns to provide direct emotional support for victims who endured the anguish of re-
living traumas through their testimony before the Commission. However limited the TRC's
psychological support to victims may have been, the simple recognition of the need for an
integrated victim aid and empowerment component of the Commission is a valuable lesson for
others who may tread a similar path". Built into this recognition ought also to be an
acknowledgment that the simple process of testifying or of telling the story, does not inherently
entail psychological healing or reconciliation34. Unresolved trauma through such a process can
equally lead to very destructive responses, rendering all the more important the delivery of
psychological services as an integral component of the truth recovery process. This is equally
important to developing tools for 'self-care for the care givers' so as to deal with the vicarious
traumatization of the Commissioners and other TRC staff who are exposed throughout the
process by having to listen rather than speak.
In the context of victims' expectations of TRC, it is appropriate to turn to an evaluation of the
TRC's reparations provisions. This has been a hotly contested terrain dominated by competing
interpretations of what survivors want and need from the TRC process, but in which the
victims themselves have often been silenced. This has also - not surprisingly - been an area
in which victims' expectations and needs have been particularly complex and often
contradictory. Some victims simply expressed a desire for symbolic reparations, such as the
provision of a tombstone to commemorate the death of a loved one, whilst others have
demanded financial assistance to compensate for the loss of a bread winner. Still others have
rejected any form or reparation as an inadequate substitute for punishment of the perpetrators.
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Reparations, Redress and Rehabilitation
The issue of state-sponsored reparation has also been implicitly central to the constitutional
status of the TRC. Notionally at least, the constitutionality of the whole TRC process rests on
the state's substitution for perpetrators in providing reparation to survivors in lieu of legally-
based compensation or damages claims. This is because the granting of amnesty to perpetrators
has effectively denied victims the possibility of any civil claims". The means of meeting this
obligation has taken the form of a commitment by the TRC to provide reparative measures for
victims which will, nonetheless, obviously fall far short of the extent of monetary
compensation which would have been payable as a result of successful civil claims36. However,
unlike the decisions of the Amnesty Committee, which are only subject to review by a court
of law, the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee of the TR'C was only empowered to
make recommendations - or policy guidelines - which remain dependent on the political will
and financial capacity of government if they are to be implemented. ;ln theory, such reparations
will not merely operate through monetary provisions to individual victims, but will primarily
focus on collective and often symbolic reparative measures. A central concern will also be to
provide services and counseling for those who testified before the Commission.
However, quite apart from the problems of magnitude (and the implicit risk that the
democratic state could easily be rendered bankrupt in an attempt to meet the compensatory
obligations of its oppressive predecessor), the current state of government-sponsored victim
empowerment services in South Africa strongly suggests that this is an arena which perfectly
illustrates the new government's grave difficulties in translating creative and visionary policy
into meaningful implementation and service delivery. These limits on the 'reach' of the state
demonstrate the vital need for transformation of inherited governmental social welfare services,
along with the institutions of the criminal justice system which have already been discussed.
The bottom line is that government is highly unlikely to satisfy the recommendations of the
TRC in respect of reparative measures for victims and this will undoubtedly raise some
retrospective questions about the soundness of the Constitutional Court's perspective. This
anticipation is borne out by the fact that, in response to the request from some victims for
urgent assistance, the Reparations Committee tabled a draft urgent interim reparation policy
as early as March 1997. More than eighteen months later - and only weeks before the
publication of the TRC's final report - did government finally deliver some limited formal
assistance of this sort to a relatively small group of victims.
Given that victims and their families are anticipating some sort of reparation, it is not
surprising that this has raised expectations which will be difficult to fulfill. In defense of the
TRC, it ought to be recognized that the question of reparation is an extremely complex one,
especially in a society like South Africa with competing developmental concerns and severely
limited financial resources. To some extent, this is also an intractable problem considering the
TRC's reliance upon government to implement any reparations proposals. Even more striking
is the tension between individual needs and demands on the TRC on one hand, and the
economic and political rationale which underpins the notions of communal reparation, on the
other. Ultimately, all this amounts to an unresolved tension between reparation for individual
victims of gross violations of human rights as defined in the Act, and the wider concerns of
the new government with redress of historically entrenched inequities more generally. In this
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regard, much criticism has been leveled at the TRC for not adequately engaging with the full
spectrum of economic beneficiaries of Apartheid37. Furthermore, there certainly has been little
or no apparent voluntary commitment from the corporate community to invest in any form of
reparation or restitution - let alone in in-house transformative reconciliation programmes. In
some respects these criticisms of the TRC are accurate, but this is also slightly unfair to the
TRC - which can realistically only be one of several vehicles for such redress. In other words,
these failures to do full social and economic justice cannot really be placed at the door of the
TRC alone, but relate to the wider process of transformation in South African society - in
which endeavor the TRC is, at best, a junior partner.
The truth is that the issue of material compensation or reparation to victims raises infinite
difficulties. Victims are resentful of the fact that they need to prove that they qualify for
reparation, or that the process may measure their levels of suffering in terms of the amount
granted. At the same time, it has to be recognized that different victims may require different
reparation packages. The dilemma is how to compensate thousands of people (whether
monetarily or in kind), with different needs, the majority of whom are impoverished - and
doing so without bankrupting the new government. Victims' reparative needs are expressed
individually. However, the more individualized the process becomes, the more difficult the
debates to which this gives rise and the greater the complexity of the burden of
implementation. On the other hand, strictly collective or symbolic reparations (monuments,
etc.) do not meet individuals needs. What is of even more concern is the TRC's tendency to
underestimate the passion associated with the monetary expectations of many victims. This has
often been based on evidence before the Commission of victims' willingness to 'forgive', or
of victims' acceptance of purely symbolic reparation as a sign of their acknowledgment.
However, it is suggested here that the TRC has been inadequate in monitoring the changing
needs and expectations of the majority of victims who will certainly not be satisfied with
notions of symbolic reparations - and many of whom are extremely skeptical of government's
commitment to providing direct forms of compensation.
The magnitude of the problem of reparation cannot be underestimated and the TRC cannot be
too glibly criticized in respect of this aspect of its work. Indeed, for those contemplating a
similar process in other countries in transition, a word of warning about this aspect is very
important. It must nonetheless be noted that, at very least, the TRC's Reparations and
Rehabilitation Committee did seek to achieve the goal of providing psychological support lor
those coming forward to testify - and in this respect it also utilized the services of non-
governmental agencies and service providers rather more effectively than was generally the
case by the TRC.
The TRC, Organs of Civil Society and Public Education3"
Perhaps one of the greatest faults of the TRC was its general failure to either utilize or build
the unique capacity of organs of civil society (particularly non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) championing human rights) to maximize its achievements. Indeed, it has been
suggested in the introductory pages to this article, that the dynamics within the TRC did more
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to isolate human rights NGOs from the process than to draw upon them. This critical failure
is all the more important by virtue of the fact that the TRC's maximum prospects of success
resided in the potential partnership with such organs of civil society. These NGOs had
occupied a unique position during the Apartheid era, partially due to the extensive international
investment in such organizations as an alternative to the illegitimate government of the day.
These organizations had consequently undertaken most of the monitoring of governmental
abuse of power during the Apartheid era and prior to the establishment of the TRC. The NGO
sector boasted a tradition of robust activism, offered the only significant sources of victim aid,
services and empowerment, and was able to play a key role in accessing and educating victims
of violence and human rights abuse about the TRC.
Indeed, these agencies of civil society offered the greatest potential for organizing marginalised
groupings and rendering their voices audible in the collective;re-telling of the story of
Apartheid. Furthermore, such NGOs were vital to sustaining!the integrity of the TRC
enterprise through keeping it on track and ensuring that expedient political compromises were
resisted". In addition, considering the inevitability that the TRC would be an incomplete
process leaving many unanswered questions and incomplete investigations, it would have to
be these organizations which would carry the baton beyond the limitations of the TRC's
mandate. The NGO sector was therefore essential to the forward-looking objectives of the
TRC, as a primary means of applying social and political pressure on perpetrators who
remained in public office, as agencies committed to translating the lessons of the TRC into the
building of a human rights culture for future generations, as well as a primary vehicle for
monitoring the government's implementation of the TRC's recommendations. Finally, it was
clear (hat in the wake of the TRC, it would ultimately be up to these organs of civil society
to act as a social check on the unfettered exercise of governmental power, thereby ensuring
that such gross violations of human rights as characterized Apartheid, should never occur
again.
For all these reasons, the relationship which the TRC sought to build with organs of civil
society was vital to its success. However, this relationship was complicated by the fact that
such organizations were simultaneously playing a dual role - both as potential partner to the
TRC, and as critical watchdog of the TRC process and actions. In both capacities, NGOs often
acted in the interests of the victims and survivors of human rights abuses who were supposedly
the primary focus of the TRC. Nonetheless, it is arguable that it was in fact the internal
politics within the TRC which was most debilitating in respect of the building of such
relationships. The "politicking" internal to the TRC - which occasionally revolved around
racial tensions and which frequently spilled over into the public domain - undoubtedly
contributed to creating fragile TRC structures, undermined public confidence in the
reconciliation enterprises of the TRC and generated public criticism which, in turn, caused the
TRC to further distance itself from some civil society organizations.
It is ironic that the most notable of these organs of civil society were the human rights NGOs,
which at one and the same time had most to offer the TRC (due to their historical role as
monitors and service providers dealing with human rights abuse), and which were also best
able to organize a powerful critical lobby. Unfortunately, these very organizations which might
have best represented and educated civil society in relation to the TRC, were consequently
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marginalised early on in the life of the TRC. The unfortunate irony is that these NGOs were
probably marginalised precisely because of their past track records of commitment to human
rights - a disposition which under Apartheid had led to an understandable sympathy and
affiliation with those resisting the coercive might of the government. This allowed elements
within the TRC to easily construe these NGOs as being politically biased, which in turn
threatened the already delicate internal balance within the Commission and fed concerns over
accusations that the TRC may be biased against former governmental operatives who may have
been involved in gross human rights abuses.
The irony in the 'relative' disintegration of this relationship between the TRC and these
organizations is even greater considering the extensive role which many of these human rights
NGOs were able to play during the period leading up to the legislating and formation of the
TRC. During this period, a coalition of NGOs working in the human rights field had compiled
an extensive data-base of cases of human rights abuse based on research and statements from
victims during the turbulent years of Apartheid. This database was later handed over to the
TRC. NGOs were also active in assisting with the drafting of the TRC Act itself, in the design
of the TRC organizational structures, in establishing the format of the panel for selection of
the Commissioners, in designing and producing proto-types of TRC civic education packages.
in researching the feasibility of a TRC witness protection programme, in doing policy research
on truth commissions in other parts of the world, as well as an impressive range of other
activities.
Thus, whilst the pre-TRC period provided a model of NGO participation and consultation,
once the TRC was up and running, these productive relationships effectively evaporated.
Taking into account the relatively short life span of the Commission, and considering the vital
role which NGOs will undoubtedly have to continue to play in translating the work of the TRC
into a sustainable human rights culture once the TRC has served its two year mission, the
failure to bring NGOs on board can only be considered to be a major tactical blunder which
should be guarded against at all costs in other countries contemplating a similar process.
It is not being suggested here that the TRC has in any way wilfully undermined civil society
during its operations - although some may even go so far as to make such an argument. On the
other hand, it is also understatement to merely suggest mat the TRC did not realize its potential
- as part of a forward looking enterprise - to strengthen and consolidate this sector which
remains so vital to the consolidation of embryonic democracy and human rights in post-
Apartheid South Africa. It is ironic and unfortunate that - by its omission - the TRC has failed
to take a unique opportunity to support and build the capacity of one of the strongest
safeguards against future violations of human rights - an active and thriving human rights
movement and organized civil society.
It is equally important to recognize the very concrete losses suffered by the TRC as a result
of the failure to utilize available support from within the NGO sector - including human rights,
educational, religious and other community-based organizations. A primary asset which the
NGO sector offered to the TRC was extensive access to victims and survivors at a grassroots
level. Indeed, one of the biggest failures of the TRC, was its inability to build such a working
relationship with civil society - and that this was in no small measure due to the failure of the
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TRC's public education programme, as well as ils communications strategy and community
outreach initiatives. The first priority of the TRC should have been to develop a
comprehensive and extensive civic education and communications strategy. This would have
served to publicize the work, the terms of reference and to educate the public about what the
TRC was able to do. as well as what it could not realistically be expected to achieve.
A direct result of the failure or the lack of a grass-roots communications strategy, was the
considerable uncertainly that existed amongst victims about how to access the Commission,
particularly emanating from the rural areas. It is also arguable that the Commission did not
adequately counter popular reservations and controversy about the role of the TRC in granting
amnesty to perpetrators. The ambit and frame of reference of the TRC was also not adequately
communicated through grass-roots public education programmes, and this undoubtedly
contributed to confusion and uncertain expectations over what reparations - if any - the
Commission could be expected to deliver. In all these respects (and for the reasons outlined
above), it is a fair criticism that the TRC did not maximize its ability to utilize the skills and
commitment of religious groupings, NGOs and human rights organizations in generating such
public education. Instead, the Commission relied rather too much on the extensive media
coverage which its activities attracted, thereby substituting media profile and 'hype' for fully
informative public education.
The problems of communication and public education also reflect some deeper rooted
misconceptions which have plagued the operations of the TRC. It is this author's view that
the TRC made some dangerous assumptions with regard to its relationships with the public.
One was the presumption that civil society would voluntarily become involved in the process
and that die TRC would automatically be viewed as a widely accepted and legitimate organ of
transformation. The other was the assumption that survivors wanted to tell their stories,
appreciated the benefits of telling these stories and that these stories had never been (old
before. These assumptions may have contributed to the TRC's failure to implement a thorough
public education programme.
Despite these criticisms it must be recognized that the TRC attracted unique and extensive
media coverage in both the print and electronic media. In particular, images and voices of
victims and survivors, who testified about their experiences under Apartheid's repression, were
viewed and heard in the homes of most South Africans. Over two years, this unquestionably
had a dramatic impact on the popular psyche of all South Africans! This alone went some way
towards achieving one of the TRC's major aims: the public acknowledgment of the trauma
experienced by victims on all sides of the South African conflict. Whatever criticisms there
may be of the TRC, this enduring achievement cannot be underestimated. However, it is also
arguable that in the last few months of the TRC's operation, the general public became
saturated with images of horror of the TRC. This was probably orjce again due to the fact that
the major part of the TRCs information was imparted through the media which was
increasingly inclined to seek to grab headlines through reporting on the most sensational and
often the most gruesome of cases.
Access to Information, Investigation and Witness Protection
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In addition to all the lessons which may be thrown up by the evaluation contained in [he
preceding pages, there are also some important practical considerations which must be borne
in mind by others who may consider the South African TRC as a model which is worth
emulating. In particular, these relate to the constraints imposed by poor access to information
which may equally plague any elaborate social truth recovery exercise, as well as undermining
either prosecution or amnesty application processes. The point has already been made that -
in stark contrast to the experience in former East Germany - in South Africa, access to archival
information or documentation has been severely restricted, not least as a result of the
systematic destruction of documents during the protracted phase of negotiated transition.4" This
has played a key role in limiting the 'truth recovery' or investigative successes of the TRC.
despite substantial powers of search, seizure and subpoena available to the Commissioners
under the TRC Act - powers which the Commission proved extremely reluctant to exercise.
The problems of access to information have also been further complicated by limitations on
the TRC's own investigation unit. Apart from the dire lack of human resources - only 60
investigators were employed to 'investigate' as many as 20 000 cases - this under-staffing was
also compounded by a reliance on investigators who were themselves often drawn from the
ranks of former South African Police personnel. This both presented credibility problems in
the eyes of some victims and survivors, as well as giving rise to allegations that some
investigations were inhibited through either active or passive resistance on the part of the
investigators. These problems of access to information were also further exacerbated by the
severe limitations on the witness protection programme established by the Department of
Justice specifically to service the purposes of the TRC.
Both the limitations on the capacity of the Investigative Unit and on the TRC Witness
Protection Programme, were essentially rooted in cost considerations. In many respects this
raises the wider evaluative question of the cost effectiveness of the South African TRC,
especially considering the range of competing developmental concerns crying out for more
effective funding from government. Indeed, the real danger is that despite the expenditure of
at least R200 million over the two year period (making the TRC an exceedingly expensive
endeavor even prior to the allocation of any reparation funding) the cost cutting exercise in
critical areas amounted to leaving the TRC with an 'unfunded mandate' to investigate and
compile as complete a picture as possible of past conflicts. If such a truth recovery process is
to be successful, then it will be exceedingly costly and there can be little reason for
undermining the process by under-funding it.
'Putting out Fire with Gasoline?': Reconciliation, Impunity and The shifting Nature of
Conflict in South Africa
In the final analysis, it remains difficult to draw any linear conclusions about whether the
South African TRC has made quite the contribution to reconciliation that is often marketed by
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its most ardent supporters and assumed by international audiences from a distance. Certainly,
it would be a grave mistake to judge the TRC by the obvious shortcomings of its final report -
which simply cannot hope (and does not pretend) to reflect the full complexity of thirty five
years of history. The great value of the TRC must be recognized as process rather than as a
hard-copy end product. Yet by the same token, one would be wise to heed the warning against
a report or a process which simply offers a 'sanitized public transcript' of reconciliation which
suggests the absence of sustained anger, emotions of vengeance, or ongoing levels of violent
conflict in post-Apartheid South African society. |
Indeed, there is a grave risk that through the testimony and confessions of a few, a truth is
constructed which disguises the sustained levels of marginalisation and exclusion which
continue to reflect the systematic oppression and exploitation of black South Africans under
Apartheid. This view represents a romantic notion of a post-conflict South Africa in the wake
of the TRC and denies the extent to which the fundamentals of social and economic justice
have not been undertaken by the TRC through its much narrower mandate. Yet in the
continuity of marginalisation and exclusion which the TRC did'not hope to fully redress,
resides the simple truth that far from overcoming conflict and violence in South Africa, the
roots of such violent confrontations have essentially remained the same. However, in the slide
from political to criminal violence, we should detect that it is simply the forms and expression
of violent conflict which has shifted in nature.
It ought not to come as a great surprise - considering (he historical criminalization of ordinary
political activity under Apartheid - that the post-Apartheid era demonstrates a high level of
violent crime which is frequently popularly rationalised in political terms. Apartheid rendered
it noble for most South Africans to be on the wrong side of the law and it must be
acknowledged that there is a grave risk that a sense of impunity based on the granting of
amnesty to confessed killers, may actually compound the problems of non-existent popular
confidence in the rule of law or in 'politically polluted' institutions of criminal justice in South
Africa. The result is sustained or growing levels of violent crime - or anti-social violence -
which presents as if it is a new phenomenon associated with the transition to democracy, but
which is in fact rooted in the very same experiences of social marginalisation, political
exclusion and economic exploitation which are slow to change in the transition to democracy
and which previously gave rise to the more socially functional violence of resistance politics.
The criminalisation of politics and the politicisation of crime are really flip sides of the same
coin.
The implication of this analysis is that it sets a rather more stringent test by which we must
measure the achievements of the TRC in its stated objective of ensuring that such violations
of human rights do not occur again in South Africa. Rather than presuming that (he risk is of
such social conflict merely playing itself out along the same lines of political and racial
cleavage as in the past, the real challenge resides in a recognition that this social conflict
expresses itself through new forms of violence. Indeed, the risk is ihat the TRC may even have
contributed to a sense of impunity which compounds the problem of burgeoning violent
crime.41 Nor is this a phenomenon which is unique to South Africa. In fact, in this simple
formulation lie some of the most fundamental potential lessons about the nature of societies
in transition from autocracy to democracy.42
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In fact, it is in the context of violent crime that the gravest threat currently presents itself to
an embryonic human rights culture in South Africa. Understandable popular hysteria and moral
panic over the levels of violence has begun to generate a backlash against human rights which
are perceived as only servicing the perpetrators of violence - at the expense of the victims. The
implications for freezing processes of institutional culture change within criminal justice
institutions is best reflected by the sustained levels of police brutality and ongoing concerns
about police torture and deaths in police custody - forms of violence which reflect much of the
continuity amidst all the changes taking place in South Africa.43
There are undoubtedly times when all countries may have to sacrifice legal principles in the
name of political pragmatism - in order to end wars or to achieve peace. However, so long as
this is done with scant regard for its impact on the credibility of the criminal justice system and
of criminal justice processes, we breathe life into the culture of impunity which is a foundation
stone of criminal behaviour in any society. At some point when amnesties are granted,
someone has to bear the moral responsibility - not ony for the political violence of the past -
but also for the burgeoning violent crime that has emerged in many countries after transition
to democracy and within newly deregulated and emerging economies, once the so-called
political violence has decreased. Ultimately, in South African society, the practical translation
of the rhetoric of reconciliation into reality depends upon whether reconciliation initiatives
reach beyond the limits of formal political and constitutional change, to tackle those deep
rooted social imbalances, which - at the most fundamental structural level - underpin the
culture of violence.
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10. In order for a person to qualify for amnesty he or she must satisfy two basic requirements.
In terms of Section 20(1 )(c) of the TRC Act, he or she must fully disclose all acts in respect of
which amnesty is being sought. Full disclosure may also entail providing evidence in respect of
the activities of co-conspirators or those who gave the orders for the offenses in question.
Furthermore, the crime which is disclosed must meet the definition prescribed within the Act.
Sections 20(2)(a)-(f) of the TRC Act specify four broad categories of person who can apply for
amnesty:
1. A member of a publicly known political organisation or liberation movement who waged
a struggle against the state or any former state (this refers specifically to former
Apartheid "homelands" or "Bantustans") or another publicly! known political organisation
or liberation movement. J
2. An employee or member of the 'security forces' of the state, or of a former state, who
attempted to counter or resist a struggle being waged by a member of a publicly known
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him/herself but who associated him/herself with any of these acts can also apply for amnesty
Once it is ascertained that a person who applies for amnesty is a member of one of the
categories referred to above, a further requirement must also be met in order for their amnesty
application to succeed. Whilst the first requirement relates to who the applicant is and against
whom he/she acted, this second requirement relates to the nature of the crime. In terms of
Section 20(3) of the TRC Act, the Amnesty Committee will have to consider all of the following
criteria in order to make an overall determination as to whether amnesty should be granted in
respect of a specific crime:
1. The motive of the person who committed the act.
2. The context in which it occurred.
3. The legal and factual nature of the offense, including its gravity.
4. Whether the person was following orders.
5. The relationship between the act and the objective pursued.
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Any person who acted for personal gain (Section 20(3)(l)) or out of personal malice, ill-will or
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by the Amnesty Committee of the TRC. It is striking to note that this seminal application is taking
place only two weeks before the due deadline for submission of the TRC's final report, and will
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12. In view of the fact that contrition is not a requirement for receiving amnesty, one commentator
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they have "seen the light", but rather because they "feel the heat".
13. This is something of a generalisation, of course. The very nature of the transition to
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example, it was specifically agreed by the parties to the peace that there would be no
prosecutions and no truth commission. This was stipulated specifically on the basis that none
of the parties were "clean" and that such an enterprise could only re-ignite conflict in the context
of a very fragile peace settlement. As a result, one of the most fascinating aspects of
Mozambique's reconstruction, has been the variety of local-level initiatives at building
reconciliation - frequently through customary cleansing rituals used to re-integrate former
combatants back into their local communities. The long term "success" of such processes
remains to be evaluated.
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15. Some further attention will be given to these debates in the pages which follow, specifically
in the context of the Constitutional Court decision on the amnesty provision in the TRC Act
However, due to limitations of time and space, it will not be possible to do full justice to the
complex debates within international law in the course of this article.
16. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act, Number 200 of 1993.
17. By this the Court did not imply that such rights were purely theoretical, nor that they were not
claimable against the State. This reference to an 'abstract right', although open to
misinterpretation, should rather be taken to mean that the rights conferred were tangible, but in
large part were impossible to exercise in practice. The same could arguably be said of civil
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dictate that civil claims prescribe after three years.
18. In contrast to the experience in former East Germany where the records of the secret police -
the "Stasi archive" - were captured largely intact after the fall of the Berlin walli the protracted
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decided administratively in chambers. The majority of the applications the committee has ruled
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on behalf of the survivors, which satisfied the onus on a balance of probabilities. In the South
African case the scenario being sketched is one which implies that eyen where the more onerous
onus is satisfied, this offers no guarantee of a successful civil claim by the victims or survivors
unless they are at least able to pursue such a civil claim through a separate legal process.
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